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Abstract—Risk-adjusted capitation payments (RACPs) to competing health insurers are an essential el-
ement of market-oriented health care reforms in many countries. RACPs based on demographic vari-
ables only are insucient, because they leave ample room for cream skimming. However, the
implementation of improved RACPs does not appear to be straightforward. A solution might be to
supplement imperfect RACPs with a form of mandatory pooling that reduces the incentives for cream
skimming. In a previous paper it was concluded that high-risk pooling (HRP), is a promising sup-
plement to RACPs. The purpose of this paper is to compare HRP with two other main variants of
mandatory pooling. These variants are called excess-of-loss (EOL) and proportional pooling (PP). Each
variant includes ex post compensations to insurers for some members which depend to various degrees
on actually incurred costs. Therefore, these pooling variants reduce the incentives for cream skimming
which are inherent in imperfect RACPs, but they also reduce the incentives for eciency and cost con-
tainment. As a rough measure of the latter incentives we use the percentage of total costs for which an
insurer is at risk. This paper analyzes which of the three main pooling variants yields the greatest re-
duction of incentives for cream skimming given such a percentage. The results show that HRP is the
most eective of the three pooling variants. # 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved
Key words—competitive health insurance market, risk-adjusted capitation payments, cream skimming,
mandatory pooling
INTRODUCTION
Risk-adjusted capitation payments to competing
health insurers are an essential element of the mar-
ket-oriented health care reforms in many countries,
for instance Belgium (Nonneman and van
Doorslaer, 1994; Kesenne, 1995), Germany (Von
der Schulenburg, 1994; Wasem, 1995), Israel
(Chinitz, 1994), Switzerland (Beck and Zweifel,
1996) and The Netherlands (Van de Ven et al.,
1994). In the Medicare program in the United
States, at-risk health maintenance organizations
(HMOs) receive risk-adjusted capitation payments
since the early 1980s.
The main purpose of market-oriented reforms is
to improve the insurers’ incentives for eciency and
cost containment which were virtually lacking in
the past. The capitation payments should account
for predictable variations in annual per-person
health care expenditures, as far as these are related
to health status. Despite many studies that have
shown that demographic capitation formulae are in-
adequate (e.g. Lubitz et al., 1985; Ash et al., 1989;
Anderson et al., 1990; Van Vliet and van de Ven,
1992), all countries mentioned above use a capita-
tion formula mainly based on demographic vari-
ables. An obvious way forward is to improve the
capitation formula by including more and better
predictors of health care cost. However, in practice,
the application of improved RACPs does not
appear to be straightforward, at least not in the
short run{. Given an inadequate capitation for-
mula, insurers with many low-risk members will be
overpaid whilst others will be underpaid.
Furthermore, the insurers will have an incentive for
cream skimming if the regulator requires that either
RACPs are the entire revenue for the insurers or
that the additional premium a member pays to his
insurer is not allowed to be risk-rated{. Cream
skimming refers to an insurer’s selection of so-called
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{The reason is that the regulator has to take into
account the validity, reliability and feasibility of the
risk adjusters involved. Furthermore, the risk adjusters
should not be subject to manipulation and they should
not conflict with the right to privacy of those insured
and health care providers. Finally, the RACPs should
not provide incentives for ineciency.
{In the Dutch reforms, the RACPs do not constitute
the entire revenue for insurers. The RACPs are sup-
plemented by flat-rate additional premiums (see
Section 2). In this paper we assume this form of pre-
mium regulation for setting additional premiums.
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preferred risks, that is members expected to be prof-
itable given the RACPs and the regulatory regime
for setting additional premiums. If cream skimming
occurs, it is counterproductive with respect to sup-
posedly positive eects of competition, that is,
improving eciency of care and becoming more re-
sponsive to consumer’s preferences. Therefore it is
necessary to prevent cream skimming in order to
reap the fruits of a competitive health insurance
market with a regulated premium structure.
Given imperfect RACPs, several mandatory pool-
ing variants may reduce the disadvantages of the
imperfect capitation formula. In a previous paper it
was concluded that one specific variant of manda-
tory pooling, high-risk pooling, is a promising sup-
plement to RACPs (Van Barneveld et al., 1996).
Based on a more comprehensive data set, we com-
pare, in the present paper high-risk pooling with
two other main variants of mandatory pooling.
Moreover, the consequences of pooling for various
cost categories are investigated as well as dierent
selection strategies in the case of high-risk pooling.
Although the mandatory pooling variants could
be used to supplement any RACP-formula, we
restrict this paper to demographic RACPs because
they are employed already in several countries and
are generally available. The three main pooling var-
iants include ex post compensations to insurers for
some members which depend to various degrees on
actually incurred costs*. Therefore, these pooling
variants reduce incentives for cream skimming but
they also reduce incentives for eciency and cost
containment. The purpose of this paper is to ana-
lyze which pooling variant might give the greatest
reduction of incentives for cream skimming given a
certain level of pooling. This paper does not discuss
the desirability of the development of competition
among insurers. Such discussions can be found, for
instance, in the special issue ‘‘Forming and reform-
ing the market for third-party purchasing of health
care’’ of this journal (vol. 39, No. 10).
The paper is organized as follows. First we
describe the background to our study. Then we will
discuss the mandatory pooling variants. Thirdly, we
present the data and methods used in the empirical
analysis. Next the results of our analysis are pre-
sented. Finally the results are summarized and dis-
cussed.
BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY
The reforms that are being implemented in the
Dutch public health insurance market form the
background to our study{. The public health insur-
ance system concerns a compulsory individual
health insurance (not group health insurance).
Direct government control over prices and pro-
ductive capacities is going to make way for regu-
lated competition among sickness funds and among
health care providers. Sickness funds are expected
to function as intermediaries between consumers
and providers and they are allowed to contract
selectively with providers. Furthermore, sickness
funds are expected to become more responsive to
consumers’ preferences.
The benefits package covers non-catastrophic
risks such as hospital care, physician services and
prescription drugs. The sickness funds must have an
annual open enrolment period and must follow
other procompetitive regulation{.
All people in the public health insurance market
receive a subsidy toward their premium through
one of the competing sickness funds. This subsidy
comes from a Central Fund, supported by manda-
tory, income-dependent contributions paid through
taxation. The per person subsidy is a risk-adjusted
capitation payment (RACP) that does not vary by
sickness fund. It equals the predicted per capita
cost within the risk group to which the person
belongs, minus a fixed amount. We will refer to pre-
dicted costs based on the capitation formula as the
normative costs. The fixed amount is the same for
all persons and is about 10% (in 1996) of the aver-
age predicted per capita cost of the public health
insurance. The deficit generated by this deduction is
filled by an additional premium that each person
pays directly to the sickness fund of choice. Each
sickness fund is free to set its own additional pre-
mium. However, government regulation requires
that a sickness fund quotes the same premium to all
*In this paper we do not consider fixed payments for cer-
tain (medical) conditions that might occur during the
year. Payment models that include such ex post pay-
ments are sometimes referred to as concurrent or retro-
spective risk adjustment models (see Ellis et al., 1996)
to distinguish them from the usual prospective risk
adjustment models. Concurrent or retrospective risk
adjustment models can also be seen as a form of pool-
ing, i.e. a condition-specific pooling variant with pay-
ments for pooled members that are independent of
their actual costs. Of course, condition-specific pooling
could imply payments based on the actual costs of
pooled members as well. However, any condition-
specific pooling arrangements would create the poten-
tial for political battles over which conditions to admit
to the pool, while those conditions that make members
eligible for pooling might increase in popularity
(Swartz, 1995). Therefore, in this paper we do not ana-
lyze condition-specific pooling arrangements.
{All employees (and their family members) earning an
annual wage below a certain level are insured compul-
sory in the public health insurance sector. About two-
third of the Dutch population is insured in the public
health insurance sector. Except for a limited group of
civil servants who have their own mandatory scheme,
the remainder of the population, consisting mainly of
self-employed and higher-income groups, can (and
does) voluntarily buy health insurance from private
health insurance companies.
{Formerly, the contract period was 2 years. In 1996,
the government changed this period to 1 year.
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members choosing the same insurance option*. The
additional premiums reflect the dierence between
capitation payments and actual costs, thus creating
an incentive for competing sickness funds to be
ecient.
In the period 1993 through 1996 the RACPs were
based solely on demographic variables. If the sick-
ness funds were fully at risk for the dierence
between their actual costs and normative costs, they
would have a great incentive for cream skimming.
To reduce this disadvantage of the crude RACP-
formula, the Dutch government introduced a sys-
tem of partial capitation. In 1993, 1994 and 1995,
the sickness funds were at risk for only about 3%
of the dierence between their actual costs and nor-
mative costs. The remaining 97% was compensated
retrospectively. In essence, this boils down to a
blended payment system, as proposed by Newhouse
(1994), in which the weight on current expenditures
is 0.97 and the weight on normative costs is 0.03.
Although the application of these weights reduces
nearly all incentives for cream skimming, it also
removes nearly all incentives for eciency and cost
containment. In 1996, the weight on normative
costs is about 0.15{. This blended payment system
can be seen as one specific variant of mandatory
pooling. We will refer to this variant as pro-
portional pooling. The Dutch government is consid-
ering replacing this system of proportional pooling
by another variant of mandatory pooling.
MANDATORY POOLING VARIANTS
The purpose of mandatory pooling is to reduce
incentives for cream skimming, given a system of
crude RACPs, while preserving incentives for e-
ciency and cost containment as much as possible.
Besides improving the RACP-formula and introdu-
cing mandatory pooling variants, the following
forms of additional procompetitive regulation can
also be considered as tools to prevent cream skim-
ming: risk-related additional premiums, qualifica-
tion of insurance contracts, no direct interaction
between an insurer’s sales representative and a po-
tential insured in the enrolment process, monitoring
the quality of services and ethical codes for insurers
(Van de Ven and van Vliet, 1992).
Here, we will analyze empirically the conse-
quences of three main variants of mandatory pool-
ing namely: high-risk pooling, excess-of-loss and
proportional pooling as a supplement to a demo-
graphic RACP-formula. The RACP-formula and
some procompetitive regulations are taken as given
in this analysis.
First, a sickness fund receives RACPs as in the
situation without pooling. At the end of the pooling
period, the sickness fund receives an ex post com-
pensation for its pooled members depending on
their actual costs. To finance the pool, each sickness
fund has to pay a certain percentage of its norma-
tive costs{. In the empirical analysis, this percentage
is calculated afterwards such that each pooling var-
iant is budget neutral.
(1) High-risk pooling (HRP)
With HRP, each sickness fund is permitted
periodically, e.g. each year, to predetermine a small
fraction of its members whose costs then are (par-
tially) pooled (Van Barneveld et al., 1996). This
fraction may be the same for each sickness fund or
it may vary over the sickness funds. In the latter
case, the percentage would depend preferably on
the risk that a fund represented as far as this risk
was not reflected in the RACPs. Pooling can apply
to all costs of a pooled member, can be limited to
the costs above the member’s RACP, or can be lim-
ited to the costs above a certain threshold. In each
of these three variants, it also can apply to a certain
percentage of the costs involved, for example 80 or
90%. In this paper, we focus on the first variant
with 100% of the costs involved because it seems
easiest to implement. At the end of the pooling
period, a sickness fund receives for the group of
pooled members the dierence between their actual
costs and normative costs. A consequence is that if
a pooled member’s actual costs are lower than it’s
normative costs, the pool takes the dierence.
Under HRP, before the start of the pooling
period, sickness funds inform the pooling organiz-
ation which of their members will be pooled that
period. It is up to the sickness funds themselves to
determine which members are pooled. In the
empirical analysis, we will assume that the pooling
period is 1 year and that the sickness fund would
select for pooling those members who have had the
highest costs in the year immediately preceding.
Although in practice, this strategy can not be
employed exactly, it provides a good illustration of
the possible consequences of HRP (see further com-
ments in Section 5, Table 2).
(2) Excess-of-loss (EOL)
Under excess-of-loss, sickness funds receive a full
compensation of a member’s costs above a preset
threshold. The percentage of members who have
*Because insurers are allowed to contract selectively with
providers, they are allowed to oer dierent insurance
options. However, each insurance option has to cover
all types of care specified in the benefit package.
{In 1996, the government decided to divide the costs
of hospital care into fixed costs (about two-third of the
hospital costs) and variable costs (about one-third of
the hospital costs). The sickness funds are at risk for
5% of the fixed hospital costs only.
{An alternative to finance the pool might be a flat-rate
contribution per member as applied in Van Barneveld
et al. (1996). The finance mechanism should be such
that for an individual insurer, the cost of pooling is
(largely) independent of the risk of its pooled members,
because otherwise the insurer’s incentives for cream
skimming would not be reduced.
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costs above the threshold will probably not be the
same for each sickness fund. Beebe’s outlier pool
proposal, in which HMOs receive a partial compen-
sation of a member’s costs above a preset threshold
(45%), is a small modification of EOL (Beebe,
1992). Another dierence is that EOL is budget
neutral whereas Beebe’s proposal is not.
Because contracts for reinsurance in the health
insurance industry are typically written on an
excess-of-loss basis, this mandatory pooling variant
can be seen as a mandatory reinsurance program
with a regulated reinsurance premium (Bovbjerg,
1992).
(3) Proportional pooling (PP)
Under proportional pooling a sickness fund
receives at the end of the pooling period a% of the
dierence between the total costs it has incurred
and the total normative costs of its members. This
is a blended payment system, as proposed by
Newhouse (1994), in which the weight on current
expenditures is a% and the weight on normative
costs is (100ÿ a)%. It can be seen as a mandatory
reinsurance program with a regulated reinsurance
premium in which a% and (100ÿ a)% come to the
account of the reinsurer and sickness funds respect-
ively (‘‘quota share’’).
Important aspects of all pooling variants in this
paper are that pooled members have the same ben-
efits package and pay the same premium. In fact,
pooled members would be typically unaware that
their costs are pooled. Each sickness fund is obliged
to contribute to the financing of the pool. The var-
iants are budget-neutral from the regulator’s point
of view, they would only shift money from one sick-
ness fund to another.
DATA AND METHODS
The empirical analysis is based on panel data
from ‘‘Zorg en Zekerheid’’, a sickness fund working
in the western part of the Netherlands with about
420,000 members. The portfolio of this sickness
fund is globally representative for all 9,4 million
Dutch sickness fund members. The data set rep-
resent all, 245,720 individuals that were continu-
ously enroled with Zorg en Zekerheid during the
4 year period 1988–1991*. Not all of these were
actually included in the data set. All individuals
hospitalized in 1988 (about 19,000 individuals) are
included, supplemented by a random sample of
about 31,000 persons from the group of individuals
not hospitalized that year. The reason for this stra-
tification is to get an over-representation of people
with relatively poor health status, which is the most
interesting group in the context of capitation pay-
ments. All results presented are corrected for the
stratification, by means of weighing for age/sex and
yes/no hospitalization in 1988.
For each member the data set comprises for
5 years, from 1988 to 1992, administrative infor-
mation on annual health care expenditures and on
hospitalizations. The annual per-person health care
expenditures include the costs of inpatient room
and board, inpatient and outpatient specialist care,
dental care, physical therapy and ancillary services.
The costs of drugs prescribed by physicians are
available for 1992 only. The costs of care provided
by the general practitioner (GP) are excluded
because Dutch GPs receive a uniform annual fee
for each patient on their list who is enroled with a
sickness fund, regardless of medical consumption.
All cost data refer to actual charges. The mean
total costs per member in 1992 equals Dfl. 1,643.
This can be divided into Dfl. 734 for inpatient care,
Dfl. 546 for outpatient care and Dfl. 363 for pre-
scribed drugs{.
For each hospital admission in 1988, 1989, 1990
and 1991 the diagnosis is known in the form of the
relevant code from the ICD-9-CM coding system
(International Classification of Diseases, 9th edn,
Clinical Modification). In principle, the disease is
recorded that is diagnosed on admission because
when a member is hospitalized the sickness fund
has to be notified of the reason for admission.
However, notification is often delayed until after
the discharge, in which case the more informative
discharge diagnosis is recorded. According to these
diagnoses, members are classified on an annual
basis into one of the nine original diagnostic cost
groups (DCGs) developed by Ash et al. (1989).
About 6.5% of the members is hospitalized in a cer-
tain year. Members without hospital admission are
classified into DCG 0.
The empirical analysis starts with the estimation
of two regression models, the RACP-model and the
prediction-model. The RACP-model resembles a
version of the demographic capitation formula that
is employed in The Netherlands in 1996. It is based
on age, gender, region and disability. With the pre-
diction-model we attempt to predict the costs of in-
dividual members as good as possible given the
available information on prior hospitalizations and
prior costs in the three preceding years. The models
are assumed to be linear in the coecients and they
both include an intercept. They are estimated by
*Because we compare the consequences that the three
pooling variants would have had in 1992, the members
must be enroled on January 1, 1992. Since 1992 mem-
bers can leave the panel data set, because of deaths
and changes of insurer. About 3.1% of the members
left the panel data set. All results presented are cor-
rected by means of weighing for the number of months
that members were enroled in 1992.
{In August 1997, one Dutch florin was worth about
0.50 U.S. dollar.
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means of ordinary least squares*, with an indivi-
dual’s annual health care expenditures in 1992 as
dependent variable and the various sets of risk
adjusters as independent variables (see section
‘‘Results’’, Table 1). These two models give us two
costs predictions for each member. Subsequently,
we define ‘‘good risks’’ as those members for whom
the cost prediction based on the RACP-model is
higher than that based on the Prediction-model.
The others are referred to as ‘‘bad risks’’.
Of course, the results of the pooling variants
depend on the degree of pooling. In this paper we
use four degrees of pooling. These so-called pool
levels are based on the HRP-variant with 1, 2, 3
and 4% pooled members, respectively. Using
another data base, Van Barneveld et al. (1996)
showed that the eectiveness of HRP quickly drops
as the fraction of pooled members increases. It was
concluded that HRP of less than 4% of the mem-
bers would be most meaningful{. The parameters of
the other variants are chosen so that the sickness
fund would be at risk for the same percentage of
total costs. We use this percentage as a rough
measure of the incentives for eciency and cost
containment.
We mainly use two criteria to compare the pool-
ing variants given a certain level of pooling. First,
the reduction in financial risk for the sickness fund
for three types of care. The higher this reduction,
the lower the incentives for eciency and cost con-
tainment. This gives an indication of the reduction
of the incentives for eciency for these types of
care that would come along with a pooling variant.
Second, the extent to which the demographic
RACPs supplemented with pooling are able to ade-
quately compensate the sickness fund for various
subgroups of members, for example the good risks
and the bad risks. The lower the predictable losses/
profits for various subgroups of members, the lower
the incentives for cream skimming. This gives an in-
dication of the reduction of the incentives for cream
skimming that would result when using a certain
pooling variant.
RESULTS
Table 1 presents the R2-values of the two re-
gression models, the RACP-model and the predic-
tion-model. The R2-value of the RACP-model is
0.05. This value is about one-third of the R2-value
of the prediction-model, which could be used by
sickness funds to calculate cost predictions for their
members. The predictive power of the prediction-
model is high. It has been estimated that for the
types of health care expenditures we are analyzing
here at most about 20% of the variance among in-
dividuals of all ages in annual expenditures is pre-
dictable (Newhouse et al., 1989; Van Vliet, 1992).
Therefore, we believe that the prediction-model rep-
resents a model that can hardly be improved upon,
given the available data.
Comparing the two cost predictions for each
member, about 81% of the members appear to be
good risks and 19% bad risks. Without pooling, the
mean predictable profit on good risks would be Dfl.
472 and the predictable loss on bad risks would be
Dfl. 2,065. This finding is in line with previous
research showing that RACPs based on demo-
graphic variables leave ample room for cream skim-
ming.
To analyze HRP empirically, we have to make an
assumption about the selection strategy that will be
employed by sickness funds to select members for
pooling. Table 2 shows the consequences of two
selection strategies that could be employed.
If the sickness fund selects those members for
HRP (for 1% of the members) who have the high-
est predictable losses (cost prediction via the
prediction-model minus cost prediction via the
RACP-model), the pooled members account for
10.2% of total costs. Their normative costs are only
1.9% of total costs. Thus the dierence is 8.3% of
total costs.
If the sickness fund selects those members who
have had the highest costs in the previous year, the
pooled members account for 9.5%, the normative
costs are 1.9% and the dierence is 7.6% of total
costs. Improving the latter, simple selection strategy
in this case would increase the sickness fund’s rev-
enue by about 0.7% (8.3–7.6%) of the total costs.
Table 1. Description of regression models to predict costs in 1992
Model Risk-adjusters R2
RACP 35(2*18ÿ 1) age/sex
dummies + 1 dummy
for disability + 4
dummies for
urbanization
0.05
Prediction RACP-
adjusters + 3*4
dummies for DCGs in
1991, 1990, 1989 + 3
continuous variables
for costs in 1991,
1990, 1989
0.15
N= 49,518.
To mitigate the influence of outliers in the prediction-model, we
truncated the independent variables (=risk adjusters) ‘‘costs in
1989, 1990 and 1991’’ at Dfl. 50,000 per member. The depen-
dent variable ‘‘costs in 1992’’ is not truncated.
The 4 dummies for DCGs contain DCG 1 and 2, DCG 3 and 4,
DCG 5 and DCG 6–9, respectively.
A table with the estimated coecients for both models is available
from the authors upon request.
*Although our health care expenditure data are highly
skewed, OLS estimation does not seem to cause esti-
mation problems. For instance, Lamers and van Vliet
(1996) have used the two-part model developed by
Duan et al. (1983) to capture skewness. The predictive
accuracy of this two-part model was comparable to
that of the more simple linear model which is in line
with the findings of Duan et al. (1983).
{The same analysis applied in the present data set
leads to the same conclusion.
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In the situation of HRP for 2, 3 and 4% of the
members, this increase in revenue would be about
0.9, 1.5 and 1.8% of total costs, respectively.
We will assume in the empirical analyses that
sickness funds would select for HRP those members
who have had the highest costs in the year immedi-
ately preceding. This way, we slightly underestimate
the potential of HRP because a sickness fund could
employ better selection strategies. On the other
hand we slightly overestimate the potential of HRP
because lags in claims processing would prevent
sickness funds from employing this strategy exactly
and because they have no claims history of new
enrollees. However, sickness funds might use the
most recent claims history available for their mem-
bers and for new members some relevant indicator
of the claims history might be passed from one
insurer to another*. Based on these considerations,
we believe that our empirical analysis provides a
good illustration of the possible consequences of
HRP.
Given the HRP-variants with 1, 2, 3 and 4%, re-
spectively, we looked, by trial and error, for var-
iants of EOL, that would leave the sickness fund at
risk for the same percentage of total costs. Table 3
presents these pooling variants.
In the case of HRP for 1% of the members, the
sickness fund is not at risk for 9.5% of the costs.
The same percentage is reached with EOL using a
threshold of Dfl. 33,000. In the four pool levels the
sickness fund is not at risk for 9.5, 14.2, 17.7 and
20.4% of the costs respectively. Although these
pooling variants reduce the incentives for eciency,
they certainly do not eliminate them. The sickness
fund would remain at risk for about 80 to 90% of
its expenditures.
The activities of sickness funds to promote e-
ciency might be dierent for dierent types of care.
Therefore, Table 4 presents the percentage of costs
for which the sickness fund is not at risk for three
types of care.
Table 4 shows that given a certain pool level,
EOL would result in a relatively high reduction of
the sickness fund’s financial risk for inpatient care.
With HRP this reduction would be lower. The
opposite holds for outpatient care and prescribed
drugs.
In sum, Tables 3 and 4 show that all pooling var-
iants reduce the incentives for eciency, but they
would keep the sickness funds responsible for the
vast majority of their expenditures. Next, we will
analyze which pooling variant leads to the largest
reduction in incentives for cream skimming given a
certain pool level.
Table 5 presents predictable profits and losses per
member for various subgroups, without pooling
and with pool level 2 and 4.
About 36% of the members had no costs in
1991. Without pooling the predictable profit in 1992
Table 2. Actual and normative costs as a percentage of total costs for pooled members under HRP, 1992
1% 2% 3% 4%
Pooled members selected on the basis of their predicted loss
Actual costs 10.2 15.1 19.2 22.3
Normative costs 1.9 3.7 5.3 6.8
Dierence 8.3 11.4 13.9 15.5
Pooled members selected on the basis of their total costs in 1991
Actual costs 9.5 14.2 17.7 20.4
Normative costs 1.9 3.7 5.3 6.7
Dierence 7.6 10.5 12.4 13.7
N= 49,518.
Overall mean costs in 1992 are Dfl. 1,643.
The normative costs equal the predicted costs via the RACP-model.
The predicted loss for a member is calculated as the predicted costs via the prediction-model minus the predicted costs via the RACP-
model.
Table 3. Description of mandatory pooling variants
Pool level
Reduction in financial risk
(%)
High-risk pooling (HRP)
(%)
Excess-of-loss (EOL) Proportional pooling (PP)
(%)
1 9.5 1 Dfl. 33,000 9.5
2 14.2 2 Dfl. 23,300 14.2
3 17.7 3 Dfl. 18,700 17.7
4 20.4 4 Dfl. 16,000 20.4
N= 49,518.
Overall mean costs in 1992 are Dfl. 1,643.
Under HRP, the pooled members are selected on the basis of their costs in 1991.
Under HRP, the reduction in financial risk is calculated as the actual costs of the pooled members as a percentage of total costs.
Under EOL, the reduction in financial risk is calculated as the actual costs above the threshold as a percentage of total costs.
*If insurers update their claims files every month, they can
use information from the first 10 or 11 months of a
year to decide whether members are pooled for the
next year. With respect to new enrollees an alternative
might be to pass on from one insurer to another infor-
mation whether a member was pooled in the previous
year.
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for this subgroup is Dfl. 783 per member. All pool-
ing variants reduce this profit. Given pool level 2,
the biggest reduction is achieved by EOL (to Dfl.
622) and the least by PP (to Dfl. 672). For the 2%
group with the highest costs in 1991 the predictable
loss in 1992 without pooling is Dfl. 8,796 per mem-
ber. Given pool level 2, HRP reduces this loss to
Dfl. 442, which equals the mean pool contribution
for the members involved that would be charged to
finance the pool. This result is caused by the
assumption we made that under HRP the sickness
fund would select for pooling those members with
the highest cost in the preceding year. For the other
variants the remaining predictable loss in 1992 for
those with the highest costs in 1991 is at least Dfl.
4,997 per member.
Almost 80% of the members had no hospitaliz-
ation in the previous 4 years. Without pooling the
predictable profit for this group is Dfl. 432 per
member. Given pool level 2, the biggest reduction is
achieved by HRP (to Dfl. 274) and the least by PP
(to Dfl. 371). About 0.2% of the members had at
least one hospitalization in each of the previous
4 years. Without pooling the predictable loss for
this group is Dfl. 16,889 per member. Given pool
level 2, HRP reduces this loss to Dfl. 3,730. For
EOL the remaining predictable loss is more than
twice as high (Dfl. 8,428). For PP the remaining
predictable loss is almost four times as high (Dfl.
14,491).
Using pool level 4 instead of pool level 2 would
further reduce the predictable profits and losses.
Table 4. Reduction in financial risk (%) for inpatient care, outpatient care and prescribed drugs
Inpatient care Outpatient care Prescribed drugs All types of care
Pool level HRP EOL HRP EOL HRP EOL
1 12.8 16.6 8.0 4.3 5.1 2.6 9.5
2 19.3 24.9 11.0 6.3 8.9 4.3 14.2
3 23.5 30.8 13.4 8.0 12.2 5.8 17.7
4 26.7 35.0 15.9 9.3 14.6 7.4 20.4
N= 49,518.
HRP = high-risk pooling, EOL = excess-of-loss.
Under EOL, the costs above the threshold for a member are divided into inpatient care, outpatient care and prescribed drugs in pro-
portion of the total costs for these types of care for the member involved.
Under proportional pooling (PP), the reduction in financial risk for inpatient care, outpatient care and prescribed drugs are the same as
the reduction in financial risk for all types of care.
Table 5. Mean costs and mean results in 1992 per member for various subgroups (Dfl.)
Subgroups
% Mean costs 1992
(Dfl.)
Mean result 1992 (Dfl.)
Without pooling HRP 2% EOL Dfl. 23,300 PP (a= 14.2)
Total costs in 1991
0 36.4 741 783 623 622 672
1–4,946 59.6 1,733 ÿ99 ÿ271 ÿ143 ÿ85
4,947–9,853 2.0 5,060 ÿ2,546 ÿ2,811 ÿ2,066 ÿ2,185
>9,853 2.0 11,974 ÿ8,796 ÿ442 ÿ4,997 ÿ7,547
No. years with hospitalization
0 79.7 1,074 432 274 300 371
1 15.6 2,970 ÿ933 ÿ764 ÿ694 ÿ801
2 3.7 5,586 ÿ3,020 ÿ1,866 ÿ2,200 ÿ2,591
3 0.8 11,024 ÿ7,987 ÿ3,276 ÿ4,764 ÿ6,853
4 0.2 20,156 ÿ16,889 ÿ3,730 ÿ8,428 ÿ14,491
HRP 4% EOL Dfl. 16,000 PP (a= 20.4)
Total costs in 1991
0 36.4 741 783 575 567 623
1–4,946 59.6 1,733 ÿ99 ÿ322 ÿ153 ÿ79
4,947–9,853 2.0 5,060 ÿ2,546 ÿ431 ÿ1,793 ÿ2,027
>9,853 2.0 11,974 ÿ8,796 ÿ434 ÿ3,967 ÿ7,002
No. years with hospitalization
0 79.7 1,074 432 210 255 344
1 15.6 2,970 ÿ933 ÿ639 ÿ611 ÿ743
2 3.7 5,586 ÿ3,020 ÿ1,356 ÿ1,847 ÿ2,404
3 0.8 11,024 ÿ7,987 ÿ2,121 ÿ3,871 ÿ6,358
4 0.2 20,156 ÿ16,889 ÿ1,238 ÿ6,541 ÿ13,443
N= 49,518. Overall mean costs are Dfl. 1,643.
HRP = high-risk pooling, EOL = excess-of-loss, PP = proportional pooling.
Without pooling, the result per member is calculated as normative costs minus actual costs.
With pooling, the result per member is calculated as normative costs plus reimbursement from the pool minus the contribution which is
used to finance the pool.
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Although even with pool level 4 there remain pre-
dictable profits and losses for the various sub-
groups, Table 5 shows that the addition of pooling
to demographic RACPs may substantially reduce
predictable profits and losses for the investigated
subgroups. This implies that the addition of pooling
will substantially lower the incentives for cream
skimming which are inherent in a demographic
RACP-formula.
Of course many other subgroups could be added
to Table 5. However, in order to give an indication
of the incentives for cream skimming in just one
figure, we divide the members in good risks and
bad risks with the regression models of Table 1.
Without pooling predictable profits will be made on
good risks while predictable losses are incurred on
bad risks. Table 6 presents the percentage drop in
predictable losses for the bad risks. This percentage
is the same as the drop in predictable profits on the
good risks.
Table 6 clearly shows that given a certain pool
level, HRP leads to the largest and PP to the smal-
lest drop in predictable losses.
In sum, Tables 5 and 6 show that all pooling var-
iants reduce predictable profits and losses for sub-
groups of members. Therefore, all variants reduce
the incentives for cream skimming which are in-
herent in demographic RACPs. Given a certain
pool level, HRP gives the best results.
CONCLUSIONS
This study shows that, as a supplement to demo-
graphic RACPs, various mandatory pooling var-
iants may substantially reduce the incentives for
cream skimming which are inherent in such crude
RACPs. For example, without pooling, the mean
predictable loss in 1992 for the 0.2% members who
have had at least one hospitalization in each of the
previous 4 years is about Dfl. 17,000 per member.
Given pool level 2, HRP reduces this loss by 78%,
EOL by 50% and PP reduces this loss by 14%.
Because these three main pooling variants include
ex post compensations to sickness funds, they also
reduce the incentives for eciency and cost contain-
ment. In the above mentioned example, the sickness
funds are at risk for about 86% of their expendi-
tures.
In this paper, we used four levels of pooling
whereby the sickness funds are at risk for about 80
to 90% of their expenditures. Therefore, the ana-
lyzed variants, although they reduce the sickness
funds’ incentives for eciency and cost contain-
ment, certainly do not eliminate these incentives.
With EOL the reduction in predictable losses for
bad risks, i.e. those members expected to be unpro-
fitable given the RACPs without pooling and the
regulatory regime for setting additional premiums,
varies from 20% to 40%. With HRP this reduction
varies from 26% to 47%. With PP, the reduction
would be 10% to 20% only. Therefore, we conclude
that HRP is the most eective of these three main
pooling variants.
DISCUSSION
In this paper we used the percentage of total
costs for which an insurer is at risk as a rough
measure of incentives for eciency and cost con-
tainment. Of course, the incentives for eciency
and cost containment will not be exactly the same
given such a percentage. For example, Table 4
shows dierences in the percentage of costs for
which an insurer is at risk for dierent types of
care. The following qualitative considerations seem
relevant as well.
With HRP, the lower the ratio of unpredictable
users and predictable users of specific, expensive
types of care, the lower the incentives for eciency
and cost containment for these types of care.
Further research focusing on the consequences of
pooling variants for the incentives for eciency and
cost containment concerning specific, expensive
types of care seems worthwhile.
With EOL, the insurers have an incentive for e-
ciency and cost containment as long as it is uncer-
tain whether a member will have costs above the
threshold. Because for some members it is certain
at the start of the pooling period that they will have
costs above the threshold, we seem to have underes-
timated the reduction of incentives for eciency
and cost containment in the case of EOL. The
extent of this underestimation is a topic for further
research.
If the additional premiums that health insurers
collect themselves were allowed to be risk-rated,
Table 6. Percentage drop in predictable losses for the bad risks
Pool level HRP EOL PP
1 25.9 19.8 9.5
2 36.0 28.1 14.2
3 42.4 33.4 17.7
4 46.7 37.2 20.4
N= 49,518. Overall mean costs are Dfl. 1,643.
HRP = high-risk pooling, EOL= excess-of-loss, PP = proportional pooling.
Bad risks are defined as those members for whom the cost prediction based on the prediction-model is
higher than that based on the RACP-model.
Without pooling the predictable loss for bad risks (19% of the members) is Dfl. 2,066 per member, the
predictable profit for good risks (81% of the members) is Dfl. 472 per member.
E. M. van Barneveld et al.230
they might adjust a member’s additional premium
to its expected costs minus the risk-adjusted capita-
tion payment. In that case, cream skimming is not
likely to emerge as a serious problem. However,
such premium dierentiation may have socially
undesirable eects. Therefore, without any regu-
lation with respect to the additional premium, it
seems useful to study the extent of premium dier-
entiation faced by members given some premium
calculation formula used by health insurers and
given the RACP-formula. If the extent of premium
dierentiation faced by members is considered to be
too large, it can be mitigated by EOL and PP. It is
not clear how to use HRP in this situation, because
it is not clear which risk-rated premium a health
insurer should quote to members who are likely
pooled. Before calculating risk-rated premiums, an
insurer has to know for which part of future expen-
ditures of a potential member it is at risk. But with
HRP an insurer will select members for pooling
after it knows all the members in its portfolio for
the upcoming pooling period. However, the calcu-
lation of risk-rated premiums has to be done much
earlier. In the situation where a health insurer has
to quote the same premium to all members, pro-
blems with the calculation of this premium hardly
arise.
In this paper we analyzed three main variants of
mandatory pooling separately. We assumed that the
regulator’s objective with pooling is to reduce the
incentives for cream skimming which are inherent
in demographic RACPs. Given the large sickness
funds in The Netherlands, oering protection
against the risk of an unexpected high proportion
of high-cost members is not the regulator’s objec-
tive. In other situations where capitation does not
involve large insurance companies but relatively
small GP-fundholders (United Kingdom) or HMOs
(United States), it could be the regulator’s objective
to prevent cream skimming and, at the same time,
to protect the fundholders’ or HMO’s solvency. In
that case a combination of HRP and one of the
two other pooling variants could be useful. Another
option could be to use HRP in combination with
voluntary risk-rated reinsurance techniques.
Many countries have implemented RACPs to
competing health insurers as a part of market-
oriented health care reforms. RACPs can constitute
the entire revenue for insurers, as is the case in
Israel, or the RACPs can be supplemented with ad-
ditional premiums. In the latter case, this study
assumes that government regulation requires a sick-
ness fund to quote the same premium to all mem-
bers choosing the same insurance option. This
assumption is satisfied in, for example, Belgium,
Switzerland and The Netherlands. Currently these
countries use a demographic RACP-formula. The
implementation of improved RACPs appears to be
a long way from theory to practice. Therefore, we
recommend these countries to supplement their
crude RACPs with an extensive form of mandatory
pooling. Besides trying to improve the RACP-for-
mula, further research on and experimentation with
forms of mandatory pooling seems a promising way
forward.
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